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JURISDICTION OVER THE SEABED:
PERSISTENT FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS
Shortages of food, energy and minerals have increased the need for
rapid yet orderly exploitation of marine and submarine resources.' As
these needs continue to grow, pressures will increase on the legal
processes which resolve conflicting claims to ocean rights.2 There
exists, however, confusion and conflict between federal and coastal
state governments concerning the precise delineation of their rights and
powers over the seabed and subsoil. Uncertainty as to ownership and
jurisdiction over marine and submarine resources will constrain
development of those resources and must be eliminated to allow max-
imum beneficial development. 3 In United States v. Maine4 the United
I. For estimates of the quantitative economic value of ocean resources see S. REP.
No. 1140, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); STAFFOF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG.,
2D SESS., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OCEAN RESOURCES TO THE UNITED STATES (Comm.
Print 1974). Measured in terms of gross product, the value of various ocean resources to
the United States was over $27 billion in 1972-73. The same resources are potentially
capable of producing a value of up to $110 billion in the year 2000. Id. at III.
2. These processes have been classified as either adjudication or accommodation.
See generally Taylor, The Settlement of Disputes Between Federal and State Governments
Concerning Offshore Oil Resources: Accommodation or Adjudication?, 1 I HARV. INT'L
L.J. 358, 388 (1970) (arguing that disputes should be settled by the political processes of
government (accommodation) because the judicial arm "lacks the requisite attributes for a
satisfactory settlement"). For a general discussion of processes of ocean dispute settle-
ment see W. BURKE, OCEAN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA (1966).
Pressures on conflicting claims to ocean rights have been recognized in international
circles as well and have given rise to three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea (1958, 1960, 1973). Basic material on the major issues in debate may be found in
lormation Report on the Law of the Sea: Understanding the Debate on the Law ofOcean
Space, 8 INT'L LAW. 688 (1974). The Continental Shelf and the territorial sea have received
dhe most attention because they are presently the most readily exploitable areas of the
ocean. This focus has given rise to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,516 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter cited as the Convention on the Territorial Sea]; and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S.
311 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Continental Shelf].
3. Because of the magnitude of costs involved in seabed investments, certainty as to
legal, political and technological capabilities is required.
State as well as Federal legislators and policy makers must increasingly depend on
oceanic science. When the interests of recreation, commercial fishing, sport fishing,
oil exploration, and waste disposal compete for use of the same coastal resources,
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States Supreme Court moved closer to a final resolution of the issue of
national versus state rights in the offshore seabed. Although the deci-
sion reaffirmed the primacy of national rights, inherent vagaries remain
in determining the extent of those "rights" which may give rise to future
conflict and litigation.
The Maine case arose out of an action against defendant states' for
allegedly interfering with the rights of the United States by granting a
mining company exclusive exploratory rights for portions of the Atlan-
tic Ocean lying seaward of territorial waters.6 The federal government
sought a decree upholding the sovereign rights of the United States in
the seabed beyond the three-mile limit. A Special Master, appointed to
hear testimony on the issues,7 submitted a report to the Court which
concluded that a number of earlier cases governed the issues in Maine
which, unless overruled in all respects, required judgment in favor of
the United States.8 The Court agreed, and in declining to overrule what
wise decisions that extend beyond preservation of the status quo can only be based on
the fullest knowledge of the sea and its coastal areas.
BURKE, supra note 2, at 13. The competing interests that must be balanced were set out in
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972:
The increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone
occasioned by population growth and economic development, including require-
ments for industry, commerce, residential development, recreation, extraction of
mineral resources and fossil fuels, transportation and navigation, waste disposal...
have resulted in the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas,
permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for
public use, and shoreline erosion .. ..
16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
5. Defendant states were Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida. Connecticut was not made a defendant because Long Island Sound,
on which it is situated, is considered inland waters. Id. at 517 n.l.
6. The portion of the seabed involved in Maine was that area in the Atlantic Ocean
lying more than three miles seaward of the ordinary low-water mark or the outer limits of
inland waters. Id. at 517. For a definition and discussion of "inland waters" and "ordinary
low-water mark" see notes 32-37 infra. The area in question was limited to seaward of the
three-mile limit as a result of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, which relinquished to the
coastal states federal title and claim to the seabed within the three-mile limit. 43 U.S.C. §
1311 (b) (1970).
Maine had infringed on United States rights by granting exclusive exploratory rights in
3.3 million acres of off-shore lands to a mining company. The other twelve states were
joined as defendants. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE COASTAL ZONE 65
(Comm. Print 1974).
7. 398 U.S. 947 (1970) (mem.).
8. 420 U.S. at 519. The cases included United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950);




JURISDICTION OVER THE SEABED
it considered controlling case law, found the federal government, to the
exclusion of defendant states, entitled to exercise sovereign rights over
the seabed beyond the three-mile limit.9
United States v. California0 was the benchmark of the line of cases
which the Maine Court deemed controlling. There the federal govern-
ment brought an original action in the United States Supreme Court
seeking a declaration that paramount rights in the seabed inhered in the
national government rather than the separate states." The area of
seabed in dispute was that portion "underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying
seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California and
outside of inland waters of the State, extending seaward three nautical
miles .... 112 California admitted the granting of gas and oil leases in
the seabed and claimed ownership of this area, asserting that the
three-mile belt was within its historical boundaries.13 California
9. 420 U.S. at 522.
10. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
II. Id. at 22.
12. Id. California concerned the seabed and subsoil within three miles of the coast
because it was decided prior to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43
(1970). The Submerged Lands Act relinquished to the coastal states all title and interest in
the marginal sea from the outer edge of inland waters to the three-mile limit. The Act, in
effect, granted to the states what the California decision had denied, although it did not
overrule the rationale of California.
13. 332 U.S. at 23. California's claim was based on a state constitutional provision
which provides for an extension of her boundary three English miles into the Pacific. CAL.
CONsT. Art. XII. The preamble to the enabling act which admitted California into the
Union accepted the California constitution as written. An Act for the Admission of the
State of California into the Union, ch. 50, § 1, 9 Stat. 452 (1850). California contended that
recognition of ownership then followed from Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845), which held "the shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not
granted by the Constitution of the United States, but were reserved to the states
respectively." Id. at 230. Subsequent cases have followed the Pollard rule. See, e.g., The
Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912); United States v. Mission Rock Co.. 189U.S. 391 (1903);
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656
(1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855). The cases
following Pollard, however, generally referred to navigable waters and the soils under
them located within bays, rivers, harbors, lakes, or other inland waters distinguishable
from a three-mile territorial sea. The California Court distinguished Pollard, holding that
it should not apply to lands under the ocean. 332 U.S. at 31.
The State also raised the issue of the federal government's long-standing acquiescence
in the State's exercise of rights in the three-mile belt. Id. at 24. Although the Court rejected
acquiescence as an affirmative defense, id. at 40, there is ample evidence of federal
acceptance of State claims to the seabed prior to California. For example in 1933,
Secretary of the Interior Ickes rejected an application for a federal license to drill for oil
off the California coast because "title to the soil under the ocean within the three-mile limit
is in the State of California, and the land may not be appropriated except by authority of
the State." Brief for State of California at 289, United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
1976]
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reasoned that because it had been admitted to the Union on an "equal-
footing" with the original thirteen states,14 which had acquired title to a
three-mile sea belt from the English Crown, 15 title was similarly vested
in California. 6 The Court rejected this argument and found that the
original colonies did not acquire ownership of a three-mile belt as a
result-of their revolution against the Crown. t7 The Court added that
"national interests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are
paramount in waters lying to the seaward [of inland waters] in the
three-mile belt,' ' 8 and must inhere in the federal government as an
incident of national external sovereignty. The California decision there-
fore rested on a dual finding: California did not possess ownership of the
seabed, and rights in the three-mile belt pertained to national concerns,
paramount rights necessarily lying with the national government.
United States v. Louisiana9 and United States v. Texas,20 two subse-
(1947), cited in 35 CALIF. L. REv..605, 606 n.5 (1947). See United States v. California, 381
U.S. 139, 180(1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Seegenerally 56 YALE L.J. 356,357-62(1947).
14. An Act for the Admission of the State of California into the Union, ch. 50, § I, 9
Stat. 452 (1850).
15. New York claimed rights as a successor to the Crown of Holland. United States v.
Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 518 (1975).
16. 332 U.S. at 23.
17. Id. at 31-33. The Court found that at the time of "independence from England there
was no settled international custom or understanding among nations that each owned a
three-mile water belt along its borders." Id. at 32. See Morris, Forging of the Union
Reconsidered: An Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74 COLuM. L.
REV. 1056 (1974); 56 YALE L.J. 356, 362-67 (1947). But see Brief for the Common Counsel
States at 7-372, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); Daniel, Texas' Title to
Submerged Lands, I BAYLOR L. REV. 237 (1949); Flaherty, Virginia and the MarginalSea:
An Example of History in the Law, 58 VA. L. REV. 694 (1972); Massachusetts Bar
Association, The Muniments of Title of Massachusetts to Her Submerged Sea Lands, 35
MASS. L.Q. I (1950); Patterson, State Sovereignty v. National Sovereignty Priorto 1789,24
N.Y.U.L. REV. 535 (1949). It is interesting that the Court found "no settled international
custom" on a three-mile territorial sea at the time of independence as precluding
ownership; there is no settled international custom as to the width of the territorial sea
even today. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 2, at 21-33 (1965); see
Note, Territorial Seas-3000-Year Old Question, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 73 (1970).
18. 332 U.S. at 36. The Court summarized these "rights and responsibilities": "The
ocean, even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to
engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also becomes of crucial
importance should it ever again become impossible to preserve that peace." Id. at 35. But
see id. at 42-43 (Reed, J., dissenting): "This ownership in California would not interfere in
any way with the needs or rights of the United States in war or peace. The power of the
United States is plenary over these undersea lands precisely as it is over every river, farm,
mine, and factory of the nation." Charney, Judicial Deference in the Submerged Land
Cases, 7 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 383 (1974) (maintaining that the decisions in the submerged
land cases were primarily based on the Court's desire to comply with the wishes of the
Executive Branch in matters affecting foreign relations).
19. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
20. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
[Vol. 12:291
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quent companion cases, reaffirmed the holding and rationale of Califor-
nia by upholding national sovereignty over the seabed adjacent to those
states' coasts. Louisiana extended California by determining that since
the three-mile belt was within the domain of the nation rather than the
separate states, it followed a fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit
was also within the national domain. 2' In Texas, the state claim of
ownership of the seabed was stronger than that of Louisiana, California
or the original states because, prior to admission to the Union, Texas did
possess national sovereign rights over the seabed.22 The Court, how-
ever, asserted that Texas' admission to the Union "entailed a relin-
quishment of some of her sovereignty . . ." and held "that as an
incident to the transfer of that sovereignty any claim that Texas may
have had to the marginal sea was relinquished to the United States."
23
These decisions reaffirmed the principle that the Constitution allotted
jurisdiction to the federal government over foreign commerce, foreign
affairs and national defense, and thus "it necessarily follows, as a
matter of constitutional law, that as attributes of these external
sovereign powers the federal government has paramount rights in the
marginal sea.' '24
In Maine the Court agreed with the Special Master that the California,
Louisiana and Texas cases were controlling. 25 In particular, the Court
stated it would not retrace the Special Master's analysis of historical
evidence, being firmly convinced that it should not undertake to re-
examine the constitutional underpinnings of the California case and
those cases which followed.2 The holding reasserted the view that the
doctrine of stare decisis carries "particular force where the effect of
reexamination of a prior rule would be to overturn long-accepted
commercial practice.' '27
21. 339 U.S. at 705. Louisiana sought sovereign rights over a twenty-seven mile
boundary into the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 703.
22. 339 U.S. at 712. Prior to its admission into the Union, the State had been the
Republic of Texas and as such had "not only full sovereignty over the marginal sea but
ownership of it, of the land underlying it and of all the riches which it held." Id. at 717.
Apparently by the time the Republic of Texas was proclaimed (March 2, 1836), an
"international custom" was deemed to exist regarding marginal sea ownership. See note
17 supra.
23. 339 U.S. at 718.
24. Report of the Special Master, at 23, quoted in United States v. Maine, 420 U.S.
515, 522-23 (1975). For an explanation of the rights involved see note 18 supra.
25. 420 U.S. at 519.
26. Id. at 524.
27. The "long accepted commercial practice" involves several billion dollars of
19761
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By its heavy reliance on stare decisis in deciding Maine, the Court
attempted finally to dispose of the interminable litigation between the
states and the federal government over seabed rights. 8 Maine puts the
states on notice of the Court's view that the weight of authority is itself
controlling without reaching a re-examination of the merits.2 9 The
holding clearly establishes that the United States, to the exclusion of the
individual states, has sovereign rights over the seabed lying more than
three miles seaward30 of the ordinarylow-watermark 3' or the outer limits
of inland waters 32 to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf.33 Some of
the definitions and presumptions that the Maine Court relied on, how-
ever, may give rise to continued federal-state conflicts. The general
federal revenue and years of reliance on federal ownership. Total cumulative outer
Continental Shelf revenue to the United States Treasury from bonuses, royalties and lease
rentals grew from over $2 million in 1953 to $3.5 billion in 1973. STAFFOF SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOP.
MENTANDTHE COASTAL ZONE 67 (Comm. Print 1974). In addition to the public and private
business transacted in reliance upon the California holding, the Court noted that major
federal legislation concerning the Continental Shelf had also relied upon the previous
decisions. 420 U.S. at 528.
The Court cited Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. W.A. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312 (1918),
for the view that stare decisis carries particular force where commercial property rights
are concerned: "Uniformity and certainty in rules of property are often more important
than technical correctness." Id. at 528. But see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
590-91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (important decisions of constitutional law are not
subject to the same command of stare decisis as are cases involving statutory construction
or interpretation). In following the earlier cases and placing great weight on commercial
practice and reliance, the Court avoided the problem of whether the historical basis of the
California line of cases is accurate or "correct" constitutionally.
28. 420 U.S. at 528.
29. Id.
30. State claims to the seabed lying within three miles have been accepted as valid
pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1970).
31. In a later case involving the determination of California's boundary, United States
v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966), the Court established:
2. As used herein, "coast line" means-
(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on islands, and on low tide
elevations lying wholly or partly within three geographical miles from the line of mean
lower low water on the mainland or on an island; and
(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters. ...
3 . ... (c) "Mean lower low water" means the average elevation of all the daily
lower low tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years.
Id. at 449-50. See notes 36-38 infra for a discussion of problems associated with these
definitions.
32. "As used herein, 'inland waters' means waters landward of the baseline of the
territorial sea, which are now recognized as internal waters of the United States under the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone .. " United States v.
[Vol. 12:291
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proposition of national jurisdiction is clear, but the specific rights
incident to that concept remain uncertain.34
One weakness underlying the Maine decision is that the means of
determining the outer geographical limit of state jurisdiction is uncer-
tain. The three-mile limit demarcating state from federal jurisdiction
must be measured from a baseline, which is determined by the ordinary
low-water mark or the outer edge of inland waters.35 The establishment
of baselines is subject to dispute since the federal government and the
states disagree on the delineation of inland waters36 and since coastlines
California, 382 U.S. 448,450 (1966). International recognition of "inland waters" has not
been established, primarily because Article 7(6) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea,
supra note 2, includes "historic" bays as inland waters. See, e.g., United States v. Florida,
420 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972).
33. Article I, Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 2, provides that the term
"continental shelf" refers "to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the areas of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of said areas...." (Emphasis added). Because technology now makes pos-
sible exploitation of resources even in the deep ocean, there may be confusion and conflict
as to the accepted extent of the Continental Shelf under the above definition. Though
nations have not as yet claimed deep ocean as being "continental shelf" within the
Article's definition, it is clear that technology has outstripped the definition's scope. See,
e.g., Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference Before the Subcomm. on Minerals,
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 94th Cong., 1 st
Sess., pt. 3. at 1232 (1975).
34. See Note, Right, Title and Interest in the Territorial Sea: Federal and State Claims
in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 463, 479 (1974).
35. See Articles 4-10, Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 2.
36. No state has yet had the boundary between state and federal interests completely
delimited. Wulf, Freezing the Boundry [sic] Dividing Federal and State Interests in
Offshore Submerged Lands, 8 SAN DiEo L. REV. 584 (1971). But in United States v.
California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), the Court rejected the State's argument that the definition
of "inland waters" should have an ambulatory quality so as to encompass future changes
in international law or practice:
Expectations will be established and reliance placed on the line we define. Allowing
future shifts of international understanding respecting inland waters to alter the
extent of the Submerged Lands Act grant would substantially undercut the definite-
ness of expectation which should attend it .... "Freezing" the meaning of "inland
waters" in terms of the Convention definition largely avoids this, and also serves to
fulfill the requirements of definiteness and stability which should attend any congres-
sional grant of property rights ...
Id. at 166-67. But see the Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. I1, 84 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting): "Today's holding does not grant Louisiana the 'definiteness and stability'
promised to California [381 U.S. 139 (1965)]. A company holding an oil lease now under
waters of Louisiana gets no more than an ambulatory title: here today and gone tomor-
row." Justice Black felt that the Court should not undertake a determination of specific
coastal boundary lines. He favored acceptance of the Coast Guard's historical determina-
tion of the inland water mark in order to stop the eternal boundary litigation, relieve the
heavy burden on the Court, and provide for "the certainty and stability which are
absolutely essential foruseful development of our offshore oil resources." 394 U.S. at 88.
19761
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may shift due to geological changes. 37 For example, a recent con-
troversy over some five hundred acres of seabed in Santa Barbara
Channel centered on some submerged rocks previously thought to be a
low-tide elevation. Whether or not the rocks are above water or sub-
merged at low tide determines whether the State or the nation has rights
to the underlying soil.38 Unless a settlement is reached neither the State
nor national government is likely to gain permanent control, for the
rocks may shift again, and with such a shift, title to the subsoil will
likewise change. 39 This particular problem arose because the area in
dispute contained oil lands. As the seabed is exploited more intensively
and site-specific economic values become more apparent, problems of
this nature will occur more frequently.
Jurisdictional conflicts could also arise in response to developments
not contemplated during the evolution of the California rule, result-
ing from new ocean uses made possible by advancements in technol-
ogy4° and new legislation affecting offshore rights.4' In United States v.
37. Beach erosion and accretion can dramatically change the location of a coastline
over time, and tidal effects have a more immediate impact on offshore low-tide elevations
such as reefs and sandbars. The definition of "coastline" "is to be taken as heretofore and
hereafter modified by natural or artifical means .. "(Emphasis added). United States
v. California, 382 U.S. 448, 449 (1966). In addition to the shifting nature of the coast due to
natural causes, man-made impacts such as jettees and dredge and fill operations contri-
bute to the ambulant nature of the coast line. But a state's power to unilaterally extend its
coast line out into the sea, the national domain, is vitiated by such federal legislation as the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-14 (1970); the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. III, 1973); and the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (Supp. III, 1973) (all require
Army Corps of Engineers permits for ocean construction operations).
38. Hortig, Report on the Jurisdictional, Administrative and Technical Problems
Related to the Establishment of California and Other State Coastal and Offshore Boun-
daries, THIRD ANNUAL LAW OF THE SEA INsT. 294, 296 (1969). Low-tide elevations are
significant because the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured is drawn along
such elevations. Article 11, Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 2.
39. In such a case the "ambulant title" possibility which Justice Black speculated
about in the Louisiana Boundary Case could occur. 394 U.S. 11, 84 (1969). See note 36
supra.
40. Some areas where technological advancements have enabled potential exploitation
of ocean resources are: fish farming, mariculture, energy production by wave action and
temperature differentials, undersea telechiric vehicles and communications systems,
deep ocean mining, and even floating islands. See generally BURKE, supra note 2, at 15-39;
Smith & Marshall, Mariculture: A New Ocean Use, 4 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 307 (1970).
Technological breakthroughs have also given rise to a whole new field in ocean protection,
pollution control.
41. A question exists regarding the authority the federal government and states may
exercise in the territorial sea. The debate over state authority has concerned the regulation
of fisheries, international shipping traffic, oil well land leasing and pollution control. Note,
Right, Title and Interest in the Territorial Sea: Federal and State Claims in the United
[Vol. 12:291
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Ray42 developers attempted to create a sovereign nation on submerged reefs
located about four miles southeast of Miami in international waters. The
plan was to create an island through the use of extensive hydraulic
dredge and fill operations, on which casinos and a resort complex would
be built. The Court held the coral reefs were a natural resource of the
seabed appurtenant to the United States and that the prospective
developers' dredge and fill operations would infringe upon national
rights. 43 The Ray holding could lead to a finding that the entire seabed is
an "exploitable resource" subject to national sovereign rights. 44 Any
attempt at such an extension of national jurisdiction might trigger
challenges on the grounds that certain rights to various uses of the
seabed are independent of and beyond the scope of the nation's physical
jurisdiction.
Maine appears to settle the issue of federal versus state jurisdiction
over the Continental Shelf. It is clear, however, that despite its forceful
holding, Maine does not eliminate the possibility of long and protracted
litigation concerning seabed conflict.45 Disagreement may occur over
geographical, technological and political limits of jurisdiction. In the
thirty years since California was decided, the adjudicatory process has
States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 479 (1974). The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. III, 1973), the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (Supp. III, 1973), and the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. III, 1973), all affect offshore rights
and powers, but none of these Acts preempt state rights to legislate in this area. Note,
Right Title and Interest in the Territorial Sea, supra, at 479. Great national influence is
exerted through these Acts, particularly the CZMA, which uses matching development
and research grants to assure state compliance with federal standards. For a comprehen-
sive review of the CZMA see Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act of 1972,7 URBAN L. ANN. 119 (1974). For a discussion of how public interests in
navigable waters can be protected against unchecked federal infringement see Note, The
Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974).
42. 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969). See also Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States,
379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967); Stang, Wet Land: The Unavailable Resource, 2 J. LAW &
EcON. DEV. 153 (1968).
43. 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969). The definition of "natural resources" as it
pertains to the exploitation of the Continental Shelf is evolving, albeit slowly. In 1973,
after great debate, the American lobster was declared to be a resource of the seabed rather
than a creature of the water column, which will be protected by the United States. See
Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act, § 15(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. IV, 1974).
44. Although the entire seabed beyond the continental slope could technically fall
under the definition of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, see note 33 supra, a new
understanding will probably be developed by the United Nations Conferences on the Law
of the Sea.
45. The litigation may arise not so much as a result of Maine's inadequacies, but due to
systemic inadequacies inherent in the area of law concerned with seabed rights and
boundary determinations.
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been hard-pressed to expeditiously resolve such conflicts. As the rapid
advancement of marine technology coupled with the traditionally slow
pace of legal development leaves a gap between the law which governs
the Continental Shelf and efforts to discover and utilize its resources,
accommodation through political processes may become an increas-
ingly attractive alternative.
John C. Barrett
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